Паттерны современного антизападничества: неоосманизм и неоевразийство во внешнеполитических дискурсах Турции и России тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 00.00.00, кандидат наук Хазыр Умит Назми

• Хазыр Умит Назми
• кандидат наук
• 2025

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Хазыр Умит Назми

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION

1. CHAPTER: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEO-OTTOMANISM AND NEO-EURASIANISM AS WORLDVIEWS

1.1. The Phenomena of Anti-Westernism and Westernism in World Politics: A Historical Overview

1.2. Major Approaches to Conceptualization of Worldviews in World Politics

1.3. Analytical Framework for the Comparative Study of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism

2. CHAPTER: THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEO-OTTOMANISM AND NEO-EURASIANISM

2.1. Neo-Ottomanism and the Competing Currents of Thought in Turkish Foreign Policy

2.2. The Historical Background of Neo-Eurasianism and Its Place in Russian Foreign Policy Thought

3. CHAPTER: NEO-OTTOMANISM AND NEO-EURASIANISM AS ANTIWESTERN WORLDVIEWS: THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

3.1. The Core Values of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism

3.2. Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism as Theories of Turkish and Russian Identities

3.3. Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism as Geopolitical Theories: Foreign Policy Implications

3.4. The Practical Applications of Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist Worldviews in Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies

3.5. Anti-Westernism in Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism as Antithetical to Western Values, Thought and World Order

3.5.1. Opposing Western Values, Principles and Thought in Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism

3.5.2. The World Order Vision of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism: Multipolarity and Opposition to Western dominated world order

CONCLUSION

Bibliography

Appendix 1. Russian translation of the dissertation / Перевод диссертации на русский язык

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Паттерны современного антизападничества: неоосманизм и неоевразийство во внешнеполитических дискурсах Турции и России»

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Research Problem

With the end of the Cold War, fundamental changes have occurred in world politics. The bipolar system representing the powers of the United States on one side and the Soviet Union on the other has been replaced with a unipolar world. The center of gravity of international system has shifted with the ascendancy of Western world order and rise of the United States as a hegemonic power. In the 1990s, some scholars, like Fukuyama, boldly declared the end of the Cold War as ''the end of history'', marked by the rise of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.1 However, events in 21st century world politics have demonstrated that we are not exactly living in ''the end of history'' he predicted, as the West and its liberal world order have been facing rising challenges from other actors, peaking in 2022 with the crisis between Russia and the West in Ukraine. Taking these recent developments into consideration, other scholars have termed our current epoch as ''the end of the end of history'' or ''the end of Post-Cold War era.''2

The Western dominated world order and American hegemony have come under significant threat since 2000. The Islamic rage against the West after the 9/11 attacks, the financial crisis of 2008 and its injury to liberal democracy,3 the formation of BRICS, the confrontation between Russia and the West that have peaked with Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, and the Sino-American tension over Taiwan in 2022 have all been notable contributors, as well as challenges to the West posed from countries such as Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and North Korea. Moreover, the West faces not only challenges from the outside, but also from within. Some European nationalists and conservative parties are pro-European and pro-Christian but antithetical to globalization, liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and

1 Fukuyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man. (New York: Free Press, 1992).

2 Fukuyama, F. ''Putin's war on the liberal order'', Financial Times, March 4, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/d0331b51-5d0e-4132-9f97-c3f41c7d75b.; Hochuli, A., Hoare, G., Cunliffe, P. The End of the End of History: Politics in the Twenty-First Century. (Zero books, 2021); ''The End of the Post-Cold War Era: Russia's Adventure in Ukraine Reshapes the Entire World Order'' Al Jazeera, March 3, 2022. https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/end-post-cold-war-era-russias-adventure-ukraine-reshapes-entire-world-order., accessed: 20.11.2022

3 Many authors argued that the financial crisis of 2008 has undermined liberal democracy and fuelled right-wing populism. See: ''How global financial crisis of 2008 hurt liberal democracy, open borders'', Business Standard, September 11, 2007. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/how-global-financial-crisis-of-2008-hurt-liberal-democracy-open-borders-118091100265_1.html. Accessed: 28.09.2022; Davies, I. "Does the Financial Crisis Threaten Democracy?" The SAIS Review of International Affairs 30, no. 1 (2010): 165-73. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27000225. Best, J. ''How the 2008 financial crisis helped fuel today's right-wing populism,'' October 1, (2018). https://theconversation.com/how-the-2008-financial-crisis-helped-fuel-todays-right-wing-populism-103979. accessed 28.09.2022.

other Western values.4 All these rising challenges to the Western dominated world order and to the values associated with Western hegemony make Anti-Westernism more politically important.

With these rising challenges to the West in recent years, discussions on multipolarized world and the crisis of the liberal international order have become more salient in international relations. Some scholars argue that these developments in the global politics of the 2000s represent the post-Western, post-American and post-liberal world order.5 According to Lehti, Pennanen and Jouhki, the current crisis of the liberal order emerged at the beginning of the 21st century in three waves: the first wave starting during the Iraq War when the trans-Atlantic divide was declared, the second wave being the financial crisis of 2008 which eroded Western claims to supremacy, and the third and most impactful wave arriving with the rise of illiberal tendencies and populism.6 The fourth wave has also begun to take form, its advent was heralded by Russia's ''special military operation'' in Ukraine started on February 24, 2022. According to many analysts, this operation and its associated political actions represent a huge challenge to the liberal international order and Western hegemony.7 Vladimir Putin and Russian officials pointed out the emergence of a multipolar world and the

4 See: Bassin, M. ''National Metanarratives after Communism: An Introduction," Eurasian Geography and Economics. 53(5), (2012): 553-556; Korkut, U. "Resentment and Reorganization: Anti-Western Discourse and the Making of Eurasianism in Hungary," ActaSlavicaIaponica. 38. (2017); Kowalczyk, M. ''Hungarian Turanism. From the Birth of the Ideology to Modernity - an Outline of the Problem,'' HistoriaiPolityka. 20(27), (2017): 4963.

5 Stuenkel, O. Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016); Amsden, A. The Rise of "The Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies. (Oxford University Press 2001); Karaganov, S., Suslov, D. ''New World Order: A View from Russia," Russia in Global Affairs, October 4, (2018). http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ pubcol/A-new-world-order-A-view-from-Russia%2D%2D19782. Accessed 25 January 2020; Zakaria, F. The Post-American World: Release 2.0. (London: W.W. Norton, 2011); Sakwa, R. "The International System and Models of Global Order Liberal Internationalism vs Conservative Internationalism,'' Russia in Global Affairs. 17(3), (2019): 8-31; Jentleson, B. ''That Post-Liberal International Order World: Some Core Characteristics. Foreign Policy Essay,'' September 9, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/post-liberal-international-order-world-some-core-characteristics. Accessed: 10.10.2022; Higgott, R. ed., Civilisations, states, and world order Where are we? Where are we heading? A DOC Research Institute report for the 17th Rhodes Forum. (Berlin: DOC Research Institute, 2019).

6 Lehti, M., Pennanen, H., Jouhki, J. eds., Contestations of Liberal Order. The West in Crisis? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 1-17.

7 Fukuyama, F. "Putin's war on the liberal order," Financial Times, 4 March 2022, (https://www.ft.com/content/d0331b51-5d0e-4132-9f97-c3f41c7d75b3), accessed: 21.09.2022; Mulligan, W. "Erosions, Ruptures, and the Ending of International Orders: Putin's Invasion of Ukraine in Historical Perspective," Society 59, 2022. P. 259-267; Lukyanov, F. "The End of an Era," Russia in Global Affairs, 1 March 2022, (https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/the-end-of-an-era/), date of access: 20.10.2022; Karaganov, S. "Why Russia Believes It Cannot Lose in The Armed Conflict in Ukraine," RIAC, 2022, (https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/comments/why-russia-believes-it-cannot-lose-the-war-in-ukraine/), accessed: 20.10.2022.

end of Western hegemony.8 The leaders of some countries, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also claimed that Western hegemony is over.9 On the other hand, some political scientists argued that Western hegemony and USA's role as a global leader persist.10 According to Joseph Nye, USA will be still the most important power in the global balance of power and its supremacy will not end for decades, despite the rise of China and USA suffering from internal decay like the ancient Rome. The American Century is not over but it won't look the same, as there will be a rise of the rest which will be harder to control.11 Michael Cox also argued that ''the world has a long way to go before we begin to live in a 'post-western' world.''12 It is a still debated issue whether Western world order and USA hegemony are ending or not, as it is an ongoing process.

These discussions on the West's decline or not decline encourage for a critical analysis of Anti-Westernism, as a challenger of the global order dominated by the West. Nowadays, Anti-Westernism becomes not just a popular mood, but also a set of political ideas shared by political groups in many countries. It makes relevant a study of contemporary Anti-Westernism and its connections with changing context of world politics. The afore-mentioned discussions and developments in world politics give rise to several pertinent questions about Anti-Westernism: What is peculiar to Anti-Westernist discourse in relation to world politics? Does contemporary Anti-Westernism necessarily indicate opposition to Western dominance, American hegemony, the liberal world order, or all of the above? These questions led me to explore the specific patterns of contemporary Anti-Westernism. To answer these questions,

8 Международная парламентская конференция «Россия - Африка в многополярном мире» 20.03.2023, (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70745) accessed: 01.05.2024; Пленарное заседание Восточного экономического форума, 07.09.2022, (http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69299), accessed: 01.05.2024; Выступление и ответы на вопросы СМИ Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С. В. Лаврова в ходе пресс-конференции по итогам деятельности российской дипломатии в 2023 году, Москва, 18 января 2024 года, 18.01.2024, (https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1926392/), accessed: 01.05.2024; Ответы на вопросы Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова в ходе специальной сессии большой дискуссионной программы МГИМО, совмещенной с VII Глобальным форумом молодых дипломатов: «Россия и ее роль в формировании многополярного мира», Сочи, 4 марта 2024 года, 04.03.2024, (https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/video/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/1936760/), accessed: 01.05.2024.

9 President Erdogan: "The centuries-long Western hegemony is over now. A new international system is emerging", 21.05.2021. (https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/president-erdogan-the-centuries-long-western-hegemony-is-over-now-a-new-international-system-is-emerging).

10 Nye, J. "The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective," Foreign Affairs. 89(6),

(2010): 2-12; Nye, J. "The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump," International Affairs. 95(1), (2019): 63-80; Cox, M. "Power shift and the death of the west? not yet!" European Political Science. 10,

(2011): 416-424; Hedlund, S. ''End of the American Century?'' 11 November 2022, (https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/american-century-values/).

11 Nye, J. S. Is the American Century over? (Cambridge: Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015).

12 Cox, M. Power shift and the death of the west? not yet! European Political Science. 10, (2011): 416-424.

one should study a lot as there are many currents. Yet, a comparative analysis of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism can provide some essential answers to comprehend contemprary Anti-Westernism. Hence, this thesis aims to reveal the patterns that are specific for Anti-Westernism in the beginning of the 21st century by comparing these two relevant currents of thought.

Literature Review

Anti-Westernism has been discussed in different contexts and with various focuses. The first group of works focused on ideologies and movements originating in the Middle East and Asia from the 19th and early 20th centuries.13 In his book, Pankaj Mishra demonstrated how AntiWestern movements and political ideas proliferated among intellectuals in China, Japan, India, Turkey, Egypt, and Iran. Mishra argued that many of the ideologies embraced by modern Asian populaces - secular nationalism, revolutionary communism, state socialism, Arab nationalism, and Pan-Islamism - were developed as a response to the same stubborn challenge of the West. According to the argument of Mishra, Asian intellectuals criticized Western modernity and liberalism.14 On the other hand, according to Turkish historian Prof. Cemil Aydin who compared the Anti-Western ideologies of Ottoman Pan-Islamism and Japanese Pan-Asianism from 1880 to 1945, the Anti-Western resentment both in the Muslim world and Asia in the 19th and early 20th centuries is not, in fact, a political or religious reaction to the liberal, democratic values of a universal West. According to his analysis, this was rather resentment against the scientific racism that considered non-Western societies as inherently inferior, uncivilized, and incapable of successful modernization.15 This also raises

13 Mishra, P. From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia. (London: Allen Lane, 2012); Aydin, C. The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Buruma, I., Margalit, A. Occidentialism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004); Boroujerdi, M. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996); Vaillant, J. ''Dilemmas for Anti-Western Patriotism: Slavophilism and Negritude,'' The Journal of Modern African Studies. 12(3), (1974): 377-393; Goksel, O. ''Defying the System: The Origins of Anti-Westernism in the Non-Western World and the Case of Iran,'' Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 6(2), (2019): 13-42.

14 Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire, 2012.

15 According to Prof.Cemil Aydin, the strengthening of the Christian and white-race identity in Europe led to a new European discourse of civilization, which proclaimed that no matter what reforms Chinese, Muslims, and Japanese implemented, they could never be equal to the Western societies because of the inferiority of their religion or their standing as members of the colored races. Precisely when Ottoman and Japanese elites were asking to universalize the international society by making it inclusive of non-Christian and nonwhite members, the new discourse of European racial and civilizational superiority was utilized to justify a more aggressive imperial world order as well as a more Christian, white, Western-defined notion of progress and modernity. See: Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia.

the question of whether current Anti-Western ideologies also view racism as an integral part of their rationale and distrust of the West.

The second group of works studied Anti-Westernism within the frame of Islamism. According to Bernard Lewis, Islamic rage against the West is caused by religious fundamentalism and Muslims' inability to adapt to Western modernity.16 Contrary to this idea, other scholars have argued that the Anti-Western stance of Muslims has emerged as a natural response to Western imperialism and hegemony rather than a fundamentalist reaction to the supposed modernity of the West.17 In the second section of the first chapter, it is examined in lenght how scholars proposed different arguments on the reasons of the AntiWestern attitude of Islamic world.

Some scholars have focused on examining the phenomenon of Occidentalism which, according to Buruma and Margalit, is a dehumanizing and hostile depiction of the West. Perhaps surprisingly, Occidentalism is not Eastern by origin but was in fact born in Europe and later transferred to other parts of the world. Over the course of centuries, Anti-Western attitudes have been shared not only by the Islamist radicals of Al Qaeda, Asian nationalists in Japan and China, and the Eastern bloc communists, but also by German romantics, Nazis, and various European intellectuals opposing post-Enlightenment modern reality.18

Anti-Americanism has been a major point of inquiry for scholars and plays a large role in hostile views of the West, especially after the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.19 Across the world, Anti-Americanism has sparked political ideologues in both left- and right-wing circles. While Islamism in Iran and Middle Eastern countries along with Neo-Eurasianism in Russia has been equipped with Anti-Americanism, socialist ideologies in

16 Lewis, B. What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

17Guida, ''M. Al-AfghänT and Namik Kemal's Replies to Ernest Renan: Two Anti-Westernist Works in the Formative Stage of Islamist Thought,'' Turkish Journal of Politics. 2(2), (2011): 57-70; Aydin, C. The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Göksel, O. ''Defying the System: The Origins of Anti-Westernism in the Non-Western World and the Case of Iran,'' Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 6(2), (2019): 13-42.

18 Buruma, Margalit, Occidentialism.

19Katzsenstein, P., Keohane, R. ed. Anti-Americanism in World Politics. (Ithaca and London: Cornoll University, 2007); Press; O-Connor, B., Griffiths, M. ed. The Rise of Anti-Americanism. (New York: Routlegde, 2006).

Latin America have also been fuelled by Anti-Americanism.20 Chinese nationalism has also shown evidence of Anti-American sentiment.21

The crisis of the liberal world order has been foretold by many scholars and politicians, some of them citing the threat of contestations of liberal values and principles, poor financial and economic choices, increasing populism and nationalism within Western countries' political discourse, global power shifts, the frailty of the trans-Atlantic partnership between the U.S. and Europe, and the erosion of the agreed-upon concept of liberalism in self-defined liberal countries.22 Alongside Marxist thinkers such as Wallerstein and Samir Amin sharply criticizing the Western liberalism and globalization, political rhetoric in Europe and Russia is increasingly colored by nationalist and conservative ideas and poses a challenge to the principles of liberalism and globalization. This challenge to liberal internationalism, the rise of non-Western countries as political powerhouses, and claims on the multiporalization of the world have been collectively termed by various authors such as the post-liberal international order, post-American world, post-Western world order, Asian century and so

23

on.23

According to some authors, Russia and China have challenged the Western-led liberal international order as powers that have sought to reshape the international order to allow space for more than one internationally significant actor. Their founding role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS has been interpreted as evidence of their antiWestern sentiment and a step in the pursuit of multipolarity. Richard Sakwa defined Russia

20 Krastev, I., McPherson, A. ed. The Anti-American Century, (Central European University Press, 2007).

21 Xu, G. ''The Chinese Anti-American Nationalism in the 1990s,'' Asian Perspective. 22(2), (1998): 193-218; Xu, G. ''Anti-Western Nationalism in China,'' World Affairs. 163(4), (2001): 151-162.

22 Lehti, M., Pennanen H-R., Jouhki, J. ed. Contestations of Liberal Order. The West in Crisis? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

23Amsden, A. The Rise of "The Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies. (Oxford University Press, 2001); Karaganov, S., Suslov, D. A. "New World Order: A View from Russia," Russia in Global Affairs, October 4, 2018. (http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ pubcol/A-new-world-order-A-view-from-Russia%2D%2D19782). Accessed 25 January 2020; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Address and Answers to Questions at the 53rd Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 18, 2017. (http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_

publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/2648249); Zakaria, F. The Post-American World: Release 2.0. (London: W.W. Norton, 2011); Sakwa, R. ''The International System and Models of Global Order Liberal Internationalism vs Conservative Internationalism," Russia in Global Affairs. 17(3), (2019): 8-31; Jentleson, B. "That Post-Liberal International Order World: Some Core Characteristics. Foreign Policy Essay," 2018, (https://www.lawfareblog.com/post-liberal-international-order-world-some-core-characteristics); Higgott, R. ed. Civilisations, states, and world order Where are we? Where are we heading? A DOC Research Institute report for the 17th Rhodes Forum. Berlin: DOC Research Institute, 2019; Jentleson, B. "That Post-Liberal International Order World: Some Core Characteristic," Lawfare, 2018, (https://www.lawfareblog.com/post-liberal-international-order-world-some-core-characteristics), accessed. 02.02.2023

and China as "Neo-Revisionist" states since they challenge the practices of the American hegemony. However, they are not purely revisionist states as they do not aim to eradicate all international systems or create a new order that completely erases the structure of everything that is already in place.24 As largely demonstrated in the first chapter, some political scientists have defined Russia, China, India and Turkey as "civilisational states."25 Besides, non-Western models and thoughts have emerged like Russian Neo-Eurasianism and the Chinese Tianxia ideal, which challenge the hegemony of Western discourse.26 Beyond Russia and Turkey, Anti-Western political ideas in the Post Cold War period have emerged in various forms across different regions and include Islamism in the Middle East, Neo-Turanism in Hungary, Leftist ideologies in Latin America, and nationalist-conservative political ideas in Europe. Hence, current Anti-Westernism is a complicated and multifaceted concept with varied manifestations across time and place.

Research Question

World politics can be thought of, briefly, as political interactions between significant actors at an international level. States are still the most important actors in world politics.27 However, world politics examines not only the relationships of states, but also those of non-state actors, international organizations and transnational organizations as well as reviewing the processes, concepts, norms, values, ideas, and beliefs of certain groups. Ideas have become seemingly more important in politics since 1990.28 The thesis underlines the importance of worldviews in world politics and their interaction with changing world political context. Establishing a link between Anti-Western ideas and changing global politics, the thesis aims to answer this research question: "How can a comparative analysis of Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist worldviews inform an understanding of the specifics of Anti-Westernism in contemporary world politics?" By answering this question, the thesis clarifies the character of these two

24 Sakwa, R. Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order. (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

25 A civilisation state is a country that claims to represent not just a historic territory or a particular language or ethnic group but a distinctive civilisation. The notion of the civilisation state has distinctly illiberal implications. Civilisational state implies that attempts to define universal human rights or common democratic standards are wrong-headed, since each civilisation needs political institutions that reflect its own unique culture. See: Rachman, G. China, "India and the rise of the 'civilisation state'," Financial Times. 2019, (https://www.ft.com/content/b6bc9ac2-3e5b-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44.) date of access. 02.02.2023.

26 Puranen, M. A Non-world: Chinese Perceptions of the Western International Order in Contestations of Liberal Order: The West in Crisis, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

27 Nye, J. S., Keohane, R. O. "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction." International Organization 25, no. 3 (1971): 344.

28 Beland, D., Cox, R. H. eds. Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research, (Oxford University Press, 2011): 3-6.

worldviews in terms of what they are against, but also what they are for, in Turkey and in Russia and under the broad heading of the political thought of Anti-Westernism.

As they have much in common, Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism have been compared by scholars within different contexts. Igor Torbakov compared the two in order to analyze existing topographies of Turkish nationalisms that could identify with a nationalist strand that typologically would resemble versions of Russian Eurasianism. According to Torbakov, ''the two imperial-nationalist and geopolitical visions seek to integrate former imperial debris in the territories that constitute overlapping — and historically contested — neighborhoods of the two erstwhile empires.''29 Turkish scholars Tuysuzoglu, Tufek9i and Er§en discussed Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism in Turkish foreign policy practice, some of whom interpreting Davutoglu's Neo-Ottomanism as Turkish Eurasianism. 30 However, these two currents of thought have not yet been compared in order to analyze their patterns of Anti-Westernism, and is thus the point distinguishing this thesis from previous publications. This comparison provides to reveal the peculiar features of their Anti-Westernism and how these two currents of thought distance themselves from the West by constructing contrasting values, cosmic geographies, imagining civilizational area and supranational identity.

There are several reasons for choosing Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism for a comparative analysis which aims to reveal specific patterns of Anti-Westernism. First, both construct civilizational and supranational identities (the Ottoman and Eurasian) based on the symbolic geography (the former Russian/Soviet and the Ottoman territories). According to their proponents, these territories hold organic, geographical, historical, cultural, and imperial unity. Second, both of them are inherently conservative worldviews.31 As discussed in detail in the first chapter, my approach to conceptualization of them as conservative worldviews is based on the ideas of Karl Mannheim and Andrzej Walicki. Third, as a new aspect of

29 Torbakov, I. ''Neo-Ottomanism versus Neo-Eurasianism? Nationalism and Symbolic Geography in Postimperial Turkey and Russia,'' Mediterranean Quarterly 28:2 (Duke University Press, 2017).

30 Tuysuzoglu, G. ''Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism. Mediterranean Quarterly 25(2), (2014); Tufekfi, O. ''Another Last Eurasianist: Davutoglu's Eurasianist Rhetoric", Caucasus International. 2(3), 2012); Er§en, E. "The Evolution of 'Eurasia' as a Geopolitical Concept in Post-Cold War Turkey,'' Geopolitics. 18, (2013):24-44.

31 Many scholars also consider Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism as conservative ideologies. See: Uzer, U. "Conservative Narrative: Contemporary Neo-Ottomanist Approaches in Turkish Politics," Middle East Critique, (2000); Backman, J. "A Russian Radical Conservative Challenge to the Liberal Global Order: Aleksandr Dugin," in Lehti, M., Pennanen H-R., Jouhki, J. ed. 2019. Contestations of Liberal Order. The West in Crisis? (Palgrave Macmillan): 289-314; Laruelle, M. "The Two Faces of Contemporary Eurasianism: An Imperial Version of Russian Nationalism," Nationalities Papers 32(1), (2004): 115-136.

Ottomanism and Eurasianism, both of them emerged in a quest for identity of Turkey and Russia in the Post-Cold War period. Most importantly, as opposing Western values and system, both of them create values and offer an alternative identity, geopolitical, foreign policy concept and modernity to the West. They are rooted in the dichotomies of the Ottoman/West and Eurasia/West. These similarities make them relevant for a comparative analysis. As specified in the first chapter, there are also other factors that make Turkey and Russia relevant as the case studies of Anti-Westernism.

Despite these similarities, there are also important differences between Turkey and Russia. The first difference is that they are members of different international organizations and have different positions in contemporary world politics. While Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, NATO has been considered by Russia as a significant threat since the Cold War. By contrast, Turkey is not a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or BRICS (of which Russia is a founding member). These organizations are an integral part of Russian foreign policy and evidence of an attempt to pursue a multipolar world order. Another important distinction is that Turkey and Russia have different dominant religions. While Turkey is a Muslim country, Orthodox Christianity is the predominant religion in Russia.32 These differences are significant for the comparative analysis of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism to reveal patterns of Anti-Westernism. Such a comparative analysis would make it possible to comprehend whether these differences play a role or not in their hostile stance towards the West. It allows to understand how Turkey's NATO membership affects Neo-Ottomanist view on USA and NATO; how the differences in the international position of Turkey and Russia shape the foreign policy and multipolar vision of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism. This comparative analysis unpacks whether their different international positions cause a distinction on their consideration of Western world order and American hegemony or not. Besides, the religion difference provides to have a better understanding about the role of Islam and Orthodoxy in Anti-Western currents.

32 According to the constitution of Turkey and Russia, both countries are secular states. However, Islam is the most common religion in Turkey as the most population of Turkey is defined as Muslim. In Russia, Orthodox Christianity is the predominant religion of the country but there are many ethnic groups and minorities who are adherence to other religions such as Islam and Buddhism as Russia is a multi-ethnic and multicultural country.

Scope and Limitations of the Research

This research analyzes Turkish Neo-Ottomanism and Russian Neo-Eurasianism, considering the period from 2000 up to February 24, 2022, which marks the beginning of Russia's ''special military operation'' in Ukraine. The ''special military operation'' has brought radical changes that it is early to analyze now. Hence, the thesis does not consider the era after February 24, 2022, as it is still an ongoing issue that will be better served by future analysis.

Resources in Turkish, Russian, and English languages have been taken into consideration. The research focuses on the discourses of the particular groups - intellectuals and political experts - in Turkey and Russia. This choice is motivated by the reason that intellectuals espouse more systematic ideas than politicians. Additionally, intellectuals express their ideas consistently and publicly, unlike politicians who demonstrate flexibility in their positions to adapt to changing circumstances and political context. Nevertheless, leaving politicians out of the analysis limits the research since politicians can shape ideology to some extent and there is a dynamic relationship between ideology and politicians.

Turkey and Russia are good cases to comprehend contemporary Anti-Westernism. However, Anti-Westernism is salient not only in Turkey and Russia, but also in other countries such as China and Iran, whose political situations could be also examined for a deeper understanding of contemporary Anti-Westernism. This is one of the limitations of the research as other countries also require to be studied for a deep analysis of contemporary Anti-Westernism. There is also another limitation that Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism are not the only Anti-Western ideologies in Turkey and Russia, but rather exist alongside socialism, Islamism and Turkish Eurasianism. However, other ideologies in Turkey and Russia are not taken into consideration in this research. Despite these limitations, a comparative analysis of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism makes an important contribution to the understanding of contemporary Anti-Westernism: Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism are contemporary Anti-Western currents of thought that have been systematized, offering set of values, geopolitical concepts and alternatives to Western civilization and system. These two Anti-Western worldviews emerged relevant to changes in world political context as well as changes in the international position of Turkey and Russia. This makes possible to have a better understanding on the features of contemporary Anti-Westernism in world politics. Besides, Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism are rooted in a conservative logic that has strong Anti-Western implications. Therefore, the analysis of these

two Anti-Western and conservative worldviews provides some explanations about the reasons of rising conservative response to liberalism and globalization in current world politics.

Theoretical Framework

This thesis explores ideas that provide intellectual background to specific policies. Political scientists had long discussed whether material or ideational factors more shape politics. Materialist and rationalist approaches emphasize the role of material factors in world politics, considering ideas as unimportant. In opposition to materialistic and rationalist approaches, ideationalists emphasize the role of ideas and identities in politics. According to ideationalists, ''the structures of human association are determined by shared ideas rather than material forces. The identities and interests of purposive actors are determined by these shared ideas rather than any inherent qualities given to us by nature.''33 Ideas play a very significant role in guiding the flux of sensory impressions and our minds' interpretation of them.34 The thesis considers ideational approaches as an important force in world politics.

Ideas comprise ideologies, beliefs, norms, identities, and worldviews. Ideas have their broadest impact on human action when they take the form of worldviews.35 Basing on ideas, the thesis considers the concept of worldview in order to analyze Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism. According to Andrzej Walicki, worldviews imply a comprehensive vision of the world, a meaningful structure and system of cognitive, ethical and aesthetic values which are internally coherent within its own chosen framework. Worldviews bear their structural unity and identifiable homogeneity of what might be called their thought style 36

While some scholars consider Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism as ideologies, others consider them as worldviews. As largely discussed in the first chapter, there is a distinction between ideology and worldview. Although worldview resides in the domain of ideology, worldview is more comprehensive than ideology. Worldview offers a more suitable concept for a comparative analysis thanks to its comprehensive dimensions. This is one of the reasons why considering Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism as worldview rather than ideology. Another reason is that Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism are eclectic as they bear a combination of different political ideas. While both are affected by conservatism and

33 Wendt, A. Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1999): 1.

34 Moses, J. W., Knutsen, T. L. Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research. (UK: Palgrave macmillan, 2012): 168.

35Keohane, R., Goldstein, J. eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. 1993, 8.

36 Walicki, A. The Slavophile Controversy. History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought. Translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975): 1-2.

nationalism, Neo-Eurasianism is also affected by Bolshevist ideas whereas Neo-Ottomanism is influenced by Islamism, holding a related critique of Western thought and paradigm. According to Ahmet Davutoglu, "Islam is conceived as an alternative Weltanschauung against Western philosophico-political tradition rather than as the ideological intransigence of Islam vis-a-vis the Western world today."37 Osmanba§oglu reiterates the idea that Neo-Ottomanism is a worldview, not an ideology, since it is eclectic, elastic and is defined by its interpretation of an empirical and historical fact and a lack of systematic doctrine.38 Moreover, Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism are rooted in spiritual values and historical constructions. Tanaskovic agrees that Neo-Ottomanism is not simply a political ideology, but rather a worldview that is teased out of spiritual and civilizational traditions.39 Thus, Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism contain not only geopolitical doctrines but also historical constructions, spiritual values and civilizational traditions, in which totality can be discovered if they are considered as worldviews.

Basing on the descriptions provided by Karl Mannheim and Andrzej Walicki, Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism can be defined as conservative worldviews. Both scholars considered conservatism as a style of thought and specific worldview, which opposes the principles of bourgeois liberalism and rationalistic-individualistic philosophy of the Enlightenment and emerged as a response to the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.40 According to Mannheim, the elements of conservatism encompasses being antagonistic to liberalism, rationalism, individualism and having anti-revolutionary connotations and deference to authority as well as to advocate collective bodies such as community and religion.41 These elements respond to Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism as conservative views of thought, as largely discussed in the third chapter.

The thesis employs a constructivist approach, which is also linked to worldview as part of the constructivist process. Worldviews constitute a set of values, belief systems,

37 Davutoglu, A. Alternatif Paradigmalar: islam ve Bati Dünya Görü$lerinin Siyaset Teorisine Etkisi (Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Western and Islamic Weltanschauung on Political Theories). (istanbul: Küre Yayinlari, 2018): 42-47.

38Osmanba§oglu, G. K. "Ortadogu'da Bari§i Tesis Etmede Neo-Osmanlicilik Bir Segenek Olabilir mi?" (Can Neo-Ottomanism Become an Option for the Peace Building Process in the Middle East?). Akademik Hassasiyetler. 5(9). 2018.

39 Yavuz, H. Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020): 208.

40 Walicki, A. The Slavophile Controversy. History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought. Translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975): 8.

41 Zafirovshi, M., Rodeheaver, D. G. "The Mannheim Hypothesis Revisited: Conservatism versus the Principle of Liberty and Liberal Modernity," Journal of Classical Sociology, 9(3), (2009): 319-335.

meanings and boundaries as well as a sense of collective identity. Constructivists emphasize the role of identity, ideas, and social dimensions that criticize the ontology of rationalism and material forces, embracing an inter-subjective ontology and underlining norms, social agents, structures, and the mutual constitution of identity.42 Worldviews indicate different pictures of the world. Likewise, a constructivist approach underlines that ''the world appears differently to different people as its appearance varies with the contextual setting (temporal, geographical, ideological, cultural) of the observers.'' 43 Moreover, in world politics, constructivism is the home turf of ideational approaches. Considering ideational approach, the thesis underlines the role of ideas and worldview as a distinctive set of ideas.

Methodology

In line with a constructivist approach, the thesis relies on interpretivist and qualitative methodology. It employs the interpretivist methodology of discourse analysis in order to interpret the meanings of Anti-Westernism in Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism.

The comparative analysis of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism focuses on the epistemic communities including intellectuals and leading political experts at the prominent think tanks in Turkey and Russia. Epistemic communities consist of a network of experts who share a common worldview and set of beliefs as well as seeking to move their beliefs to politics. Hence, a common worldview/vision frames epistemic communities which are recognised as thought communities.44 According to the conceptualization of worldview, Turkish and Russian intellectuals and experts, who adhere to Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism, were selected based on the following three criteria: The criticism of the West that is based on principles arising from explicit political doctrine; the doctrine fits to the framework of conservative worldview; bearing a geopolitical vision and collective consciousness according to Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist perspectives.

According to the concept of worldview, I analyzed the components of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism. The most essential element of worldviews is to imply set of values. So, I started my analysis with asking which values and coherent set of ideas are elaborated by Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism. I compared the role of these values in

42Fierke, K. M. Constructivism in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Eds. Dunne, T.; Kurki, M., Smith. Steve. (Oxford University Press. 2007): 166-185.

43 Moses, J. W., Knutsen, T. L. Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research. (UK: Palgrave macmillan, 2012).

44 Antoniades, A. "Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the Construction of (World) Politics," Global Society, January (2003): 24-30.

the formation of Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist worldviews. Through this comparison, I revealed both similarities and differences between two value systems.

Another essential element of worldview is the creation of collective consciousness. Worldviews determine a group's identity by answering ultimate questions such as 'Who/Where are we?'45 Based on this argument, I asked how Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism determine Turkish and Russian identities, and construct the Ottoman and Eurasian supranational and civilizational identities through the imagined territories.

Religion is a secondary element of worldview, as it is important not for all worldviews. Nevertheless, many scholars, especially from religious studies and theology, consider religions as worldviews and some of whom underlines the role of religion in constructing worldviews that is relevant to contemporary world politics.46 Taking this into account, I paid an attention to the role of religion in the elaboration of Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist worldviews. I asked how Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism consider Islam and Orthodox Christianity.

Worldviews define one's place in the world and offer global overviews; thus, I analyzed how Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism define the international position of Turkey and Russia. As the certain ways of political thinking, worldviews move values to foreign policy. Therefore, worldviews play a role in the shape of foreign policy. Considering that worldviews affect foreign policy outcomes and bring meanings to world politics,47 I analyzed the geopolitical concepts and foreign policy vision of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism. I analyzed how these two worldviews define the Ottoman and Eurasian regions as distinctive territorial and civilizational areas.

45 Neville, R. C. ''Worldviews.'' American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, September 2009, Vol. 30, No. 3 September (2009): 240.

46 Davies, D. J. Worldview Religious Studies, (London: Routledge, 2022); Valk, J., Albayrak, H., Selcuk, M. An Islamic Worldview from Turkey, CA: (USA, Palgrave, 2017); Altintas, M. C. Worldviews and Identity Discernment of Turkish Youth and the Role of Religious Education: An investigation of Imam-Hatip High Schools' senior students' meaning-making of the world in the 21st century (Unpublished doctoral thesis), University College London, 2019; Timothy A. Byrnes. ''Religious Worldviews in Global Politics'' in Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2022): 255-276.

47 Haas, M., Nau, H. ''Political Worldviews in International Relations: The Importance of Ideologies and Foreign Policy Traditions," in Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022): 73-99; Katzenstein, P. ''Worldviews in World Politics,'' in Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2022): 15.

The hostile views of the West emerged in different variations because the West has many representations and aspects. In order to compare which aspect of the West is opposed by Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism, I traced the following analytical framework. In the first chapter, I traced the evolving meanings of the West and Anti-Westernism through extensive literature review. I revealed that the West encompasses varying values and principles including modernity, the Enlightenment, secularism, liberalism, individualism and globalization. This allowed me to ask in the third chapter how Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist worldviews consider Western values and principles. Considering that conservatism is a specific worldview which is antagonistic to the values of liberalism and the Enlightenment, I analyzed the conservative reaction of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism to Western liberal and secular values.

Worldviews offer global overviews and a different vision of the world. Based on this argument, I analyzed how Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism offer an alternative world order to the West and consider multipolar world, normatively blaming on the West. The Western-led world order is based on Western values and principles such as liberalism, democracy, human rights, and cosmopolitanism. In addition to values and norms, the West represents actors and international institutions in world politics. As a dominant force in contemporary world politics, ''the West shapes international relations through three key elements: The West as actor; the West as institutional model; and the West as an intellectual foundation.''48 Based on this argument, I asked how Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism consider Western actors (the U.S. the EU and European powers), institutions (the UN, NATO etc), and intellectual foundations (Western thought, philosophy and epistemology).

Considering that the West in world politics represents values, actors, institutions, intellectual foundation and world order, I ask the questions (as specified in the third section of the first chapter) for each case in order to compare the features of Anti-Westernism in Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist worldviews:

Empirical Data

I analyzed the articles and books of intellectuals and political experts at the think tanks chosen according to the three criteria specified in the page 15. Some of these think tanks are government-funded and play a role in shaping Turkish and Russian foreign policies. These

48 O'Hagan, J. Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said. (London: Palgrave, 2022): 9-10.

think tanks are the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) in Turkey and the Valdai Club in Russia. 49 Katehon was established by Neo-Eurasianist intellectuals. 50 The Izborksy Club represents conservative intellectuals, including Neo-Eurasianist intellectuals.51

The articles were retrieved directly from the think tanks' websites (setav.org; orsam.org.tr; valdaiclub.com; izborsk-club.ru; katehon.com) and from the journals of Russia in Global Affairs and Russkiye Strategiy since some leading Russian political experts, especially from the Valdai Club, publish analyses in Russia in Global Affairs while those by the Izborsky Club are usually published in Russkiye Strategiy. Also, some articles were retrieved from the websites of the Russian newspaper Zavtra and the Turkish newspaper Yeni §afak as some prominent Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist intellectuals write in these two conservative periodicals. This analysis includes publications from 2000 up to February 24, 2022.

Turkey Russia

- Articles & books of most leading -Articles & books of most leading Neo-Ottomanist intellectuals Neo-Eurasianist intellectuals

- Experts at think-tanks: -Experts at think-tanks:

SETA, ORSAM Valdai Club, Izborsky Club, Katehon

- Yeni §afak Newspaper - Zavtra Newspaper

Table 1: Primary Sources

Scientific Value and Contribution to Scientific Field

This thesis mainly seeks to contribute to the conceptualization and understanding of contemporary Anti-Westernism in world politics. The research bears an interdisciplinary perspective, drawing from studies on ideologies, civilizations, foreign policy and world politics. Moreover, the thesis contributes more broadly to contemporary Turkey and Russia studies.

Mostly based on materialist approaches, scholars have discussed the crisis of the Western dominated world order, rising non-Western states, a multipolar world order and the decline of the United States. However, this thesis demonstrates that the crisis of the Western-

49 For the webpages of the think tanks: SETA, (https://setav.org/); ORSAM, (https://orsam.org.tr/); Valdai Club, (https://valdaiclub.com/).

50 Katehon is a Russian think tank, to which Dugin contributes, funded by Neo-Eurasianists. See: (https://katehon.com/), date of access: 10.11.2022.

51 See: izborsky Club (https://izborsk-club.ru/).

led world order extends beyond these discussions and material approaches, as current AntiWestern ideologies and ideational approaches need to be considered for a more thorough analysis. Basing on ideational approach, the thesis utilizes the concept of worldview in order to demonstrate how value difference is an important cause of conflict and divergence between the Western and non-Western world, and argues that worldviews should be taken into consideration for the analysis of world politics. Hence, the use of the concept of worldview for analyzing contemporary Anti-Westernism in world politics is a novel point of this thesis.

Statements to be defended

1. The analysis of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism, which are normative worldviews, demonstrates some opportunities to upgrade constructivist approach in the study of world politics by adding a normative dimension and offering guidance for international order. The examination of these two worldviews contributes to constructivist approach, demonstrating that worldviews indicate shared consistent patterns.

2. Opposition to Western-dominated world order appeared as the common and prominent pattern of Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist worldviews. Both of them strongly opposed Western hegemony and advocated for a multipolar world order, arguing that Western hegemony is ending and the international order is in a crisis due to the lack of presentation of non-Western states. However, unlike Neo-Ottomanism, Neo-Eurasianism is also characterized by strong Anti-Americanism, including opposition to USA hegemony, NATO and Transatlanticism.

3. Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism provided a conservative response to Western values. While Neo-Eurasianism rather opposes the liberal values of the West such as individualism, cosmopolitanism and globalization; Neo-Ottomanism more runs counter to European values such as modernity, secularism and the Enlightenment.

4. The comparative analysis of Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism contributed to the previous scholarship about Anti-Westernism, informing that Anti-Westernism represents both continuities and discontinuities from past to the present. The previous literature demonstrated that in the late 19th and 20th centuries, the hostile views of the West emerged in different forms, including opposition to Western values such as materialism, individualism, rationalism, modernity, as well as the policies of Western powers such as imperialism, colonialism and racism. This comparative analysis revealed that some of these forms are still salient in the 21sth century Anti-Westernism.

5. Previous publications and scholars defined three key elements of Neo-Ottomanism as the Ottoman historic legacy, Sunni-Muslim identity and the Ottoman geographic sphere. This thesis elucidates that Neo-Ottomanism represents a conservative worldview, and Anti-Westernism is an essential element of Neo-Ottomanism in addition to these three key elements.

6. Neo-Eurasianism encompasses the evolving definitions of Eurasian territory, which is relevant to changing world politics and the international position of Russia. The emerging new concepts such as the 'Greater Eurasia' and 'Pragmatic Eurasianism' indicate the transformation in the definition of Eurasian territory from the former model 'Eurasia=Russia' to a wider multipolar structure in which Russia is only one of the significant parts of Eurasia, which also involves other powers.

7. Neo-Ottomanist and Neo-Eurasianist conservative worldviews elaborated a coherent set of ideas and values that are based on specific moral principles, civilizational values, traditional religions, believe in strong authority and the imagine of supranational identity. Besides, they elaborated an assertive, ambitious and expansionist foreign policy doctrine as well as imperialistic visions for the Turkish and Russian states. However, these values play different roles in their formations. While Neo-Ottomanism placed a more importance to the religion (Islam) and glorification of the history, Neo-Eurasianism more developed geographical theories which identify the Eurasian geography with values and consider Russia as a Land-based civilization. Besides, Neo-Eurasianism puts more emphasizes on the importance of strong authority for Russia.

8. Neo-Ottomanism and Neo-Eurasianism can be considered as context-specific justifications of alternative (non-Western) modernities. The 21sth century world witnesses not only the emergence of non-Western states but also the rise of alternative non-Western modernities and cultural models accordingly. Globalization in the 21sth century interestingly provides avenues for alternative modernities to gain visibility and influence. This indicates a transformation from a solely Western-centric globalization toward a new type globalization, marking the reintegration of non-Western traditions into modernity, emergence of pluralist modernity and the globalization of non-Western floor.

Dissertation validation

The research results were presented at the following scientific conferences:

1. ''Anti-Westernism in Eurasia: Neo-Eurasianism, Neo-Turanism and Neo-Ottomanism'' (The Fifth Annual Tartu Conference on Russian and East European Studies, 6-8 June 2021)

2. ''Anti-Western Nationalism in the Post-Communist Space: Neo-Eurasianism and Neo-Turanism'' (The Conference of Irish Association for Russian, Central and East European Studies, 20-21 May 2021)

3. "Neo-Islamism in Turkish Foreign Policy After 2012" (The International Conference of the Southern Federal University in Russia on the theme: International Relations in Situations of Global Uncertainty: History and the Present, 20-21 October 2020)

4. "Anti-Western Sentiment in Asia: Japanese Pan-Asianism and Ottoman Pan-Islamism" (The 22nd Conference of the History and Culture of Japan, Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia, 17-19 February 2020)

The research results formed the basis for a number of publications:

1. Hazir, U. N. ''Anti-Westernism in Turkey's Neo-Ottomanist Foreign Policy Under Erdogan, " Russia in Global Affairs, No. 2 April/June, 2022: 164-183.

2. Hazir, U. N. ''Contemporary Anti-Westernism in Russia and Turkey: The Comparative Analysis of Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and Davutoglu's Neo-Ottomanism,'' Political Science. 2023. No 2. P. 295-314. (In Russian)

3. Hazir, U. N. ''The West as a Model? The Comparative Analysis of the Modernization Experiences of the Russian and Ottoman Empires in Turkish Literature,'' Russia and Contemporary World, 2021. No 3. P. 22-36. (In Russian)

Заключение диссертации по теме «Другие cпециальности», Хазыр Умит Назми

Выводы

Сегодня Запад сталкивается не только с геополитическим вызовом со стороны поднимающихся незападных держав, но и с интеллектуальным вызовом со стороны антизападных течений интеллектуальной мысли. Неоосманистское и неоевразийское мировоззрения бросают вызов западным ценностям, мышлению, философии и западоцентризму, рассматривая кризис мирового порядка, в котором доминирует Запад, как более масштабный кризис западной цивилизации, ценностей и парадигмы.

Сравнительный анализ неоосманизма и неоевразийства как антизападных и консервативных мировоззрений показал, что модели современного антизападничества включают в себя оппозицию доминирующему западному миропорядку, критику западной философии, мысли, парадигмы и консервативный ответ на западную модернизацию и либеральные ценности, а также предложение альтернативы Западу на основе цивилизационных ориентиров. Оппозиция доминирующему западному миропорядку предстает как яркий паттерн современного антизападничества, поскольку и неоосманизм, и неоевразийство решительно выступают против западной гегемонии и за многополярный миропорядок. Эти два нормативных мировоззрения выдвигают моральные обвинения в адрес международного порядка, находящегося под господством Запада. Данные моральные обвинения отражаются во внешнеполитической практике Турции и России и их подходе к международному порядку, поскольку Эрдоган и Путин утверждают, что международный порядок представляет собой несправедливость, ненадежность, двойные стандарты и его правилами злоупотребляет Запад. Это свидетельствует о моральном и ценностном кризисе мирового порядка, в котором доминирует Запад и который вызван действиями западных акторов, которые действуют исходя из своих собственных ценностей.

Хотя неоосманизм и неоевразийство имеют общую цель - бросить вызов мировому порядку, в котором доминирует Запад, в некоторых моментах они расходятся. Отличаясь от неоосманизма, неоевразийство представляет собой сильный антиамериканизм, выступая против гегемонии США, атлантизма и НАТО. Неоевразийство стремится создать евразийский цивилизационный и геополитический блок в противовес американской гегемонии, рассматривая США как антипод Евразии.

Консервативная логика имеет сильные антизападные последствия, поскольку неоосманистское и неоевразийское мировоззрения представляли собой консервативный ответ на западную современность, либеральные и светские ценности на основе следующих разделений: консерватизм/либерализм, авторитаризм/демократия,

религия/светскость, коллективизм/индивидуализм, традиционализм/модернизм, ислам/Запад и Евразия/Запад. Если неоосманизм в большей степени противостоит секуляризму, модернизации и Просвещению, то неоевразийство скорее антагонистично по отношению к либерализму и глобализации. Либерализм одержал победу над альтернативными идеологиями, такими как социализм и фашизм, и к концу XX века стал нормой международного порядка. Однако в мировой политике XXI века консерватизм предстает как наиболее конкурентоспособный аналог либерализма. Либерализм и его ценности рискуют перестать быть нормой и основной парадигмой международного порядка, что связано с падением доминирования Запада в мировой политике. Поэтому сегодня идет борьба не только между западными и незападными державами, но и борьба между ценностями. Консерватизм, как специфическое мировоззрение, играет важную роль в битве за ценности. Если западные ценности представляют собой либерализм, индивидуализм, модернизм и секулярно-рациональные ценности, то консервативное мировоззрение — это религия, традиционные ценности, мораль, сильная власть и националистическое мировоззрение. Эти принципы консервативного мировоззрения очень четко прослеживаются в неоосманизме и неоевразийстве.

В качестве альтернативы западной цивилизации неоосманизм и неоевразийство сконструировали османскую и евразийскую цивилизационные идентичности на основе воображаемых цивилизационных ареалов, включающих бывшие территории Турции и России. Сторонники неоосманизма и неоевразийства считают, что люди, живущие в этих цивилизационных регионах, разделяют одни и те же ценности, исторические и культурные связи, которые расходятся с западной цивилизацией и ценностями. Кроме того, и неоосманизм, и неоевразийство относились не только к внешнему (западному), но и к внутреннему другому. Если в неоевразийстве в качестве внутреннего другого выступали либералы, то в неоосманизме в качестве внутреннего другого рассматривались кемалисты.

Основываясь на видении макрополитической идентичности, неоосманизм и неоевразийство разработали проактивную, напористую внешнеполитическую доктрину и империалистическую концепцию для турецкого и российского государств. В неоосманизме и неоевразийстве ярко выражен синдром «мании величия». В неоевразийстве проявляется великодержавный и имперский комплекс России. Неоосманисты также испытывают имперские чувства, идущие от Османской и Сельджукской империй, стремясь воскресить Османскую империю и усилить влияние

Турции на внутренние районы Османской империи. Опираясь на историческое наследие Османской империи и используя культурные связи, неоосманизм стремится подтвердить влияние и лидирующую роль Турции на Ближнем Востоке, Балканах, в Северной Африке, на Кавказе и во всем исламском мире. Аналогичным образом, неоевразийство стремится укрепить позиции России как евразийской державы на территориях ее формирования, чтобы утвердить свое влияние в Восточной Европе, на Кавказе и в Центральной Азии, а также бросить вызов вмешательству Запада в соседние с ней страны. Более того, их имперский комплекс связан со сложными и парадоксальными отношениями Турции и России с Западом. За последние двести лет оба государства не раз пытались стать частью западной цивилизации. Однако к Турции и России применялись двойные стандарты, и Запад не принимал их в полной мере. Это послужило катализатором их имперских устремлений и ориентации на Восток и свои бывшие территории.

Неоосманизм и неоевразийство выработали целостные ценности на основе консерватизма, морали, традиций, уважения к сильной власти, ислама и православия. Однако роль этих ценностей в формировании неоосманизма и неоевразийства различается. По сравнению с неоосманизмом, неоевразийство разработало больше географических теорий, которые отождествляют евразийский ландшафт с ценностями и цивилизацией, основанной на земле. Кроме того, неоевразийство делает больший акцент на важности сильной власти, подчеркивая значение идеократии и суверенитета для России. С другой стороны, религия имеет большее значение в неоосманизме, чем в неоевразийстве. Будучи мировоззрением, основанным на исламе, неоосманизм ставит ислам в центр турецко-османской идентичности и считает ислам объединяющей силой среди стран региона с мусульманским большинством. Кроме того, неоосманизм делает больший акцент на истории, прославляя османское прошлое, ссылаясь на османо-исламское наследие и рассматривая Турцию как наследницу Османской империи. Таким образом, основные элементы неоосманизма включают в себя историческое наследие Османской империи, мусульманскую идентичность, географическую территорию Османской империи, а также консервативные ценности и антизападничество.

Неоосманизм и неоевразийство претерпели процесс трансформации, в ходе которого их конфигурации расширялись в соответствии с меняющимся контекстом внутренней и международной политики. Османизм возник в три волны: Первая волна, классическая османистика, возникла как реакция на распад Османской империи в конце

XIX века. Вторая волна, которую можно определить как либеральный неоосманизм, возникла в поисках новой идентичности и внешнеполитического видения Турции во время руководства Тургута Озала в начале 1990-х годов. Третья волна возникла с более исламистской и антизападной позицией во время руководства Эрдогана после 2002 года. Аналогичным образом, неоевразийство, имеющее интеллектуальные и исторические корни, распространялось в разных волнах. По сравнению с классическим евразийством, возникшим в 1920-х годах, неоевразийство разработало новые географические теории и в большей степени подчеркнуло консервативные и специфические моральные ценности. Неоевразийство охватывало эволюционирующие определения евразийской территории. Появление новых понятий, таких как «Большая Евразия» и «Прагматическое евразийство», свидетельствует о трансформации определения евразийской территории от прежней модели «Евразия=Россия» к более широкой многополярной структуре, в которой Россия является лишь одной из значимых частей Евразии, включающей другие державы, такие как Китай и Индия. Эта трансформация в определении Евразии имеет отношение к меняющейся мировой политике и международному положению России. Ведь Россия теперь не способна быть полярной сама по себе, появляются новые незападные державы. Поэтому считается, что «Большая Евразия» позволит России вернуть статус великой державы, повысить свой международный статус в формирующемся постлиберальном мировом порядке и преодолеть свою слабость, а также поднять потенциал, чтобы бросить вызов Западу. Концепция «Большой Евразии» имеет такие последствия для российской внешней политики, как создание ШОС и углубление российско-китайских отношений в стремлении к многополярности. Это свидетельствует о том, что определение евразийской территории неоевразийским мировоззрением не является статичным, оно подвержено изменениям в зависимости от меняющегося мирового политического контекста. Кроме того, это продемонстрировало, что мировоззрение имеет последствия для внешней политики.

Анализ неоосманистского и неоевразийского мировоззрений доказал, что мировоззрения определяют внешнюю политику, поскольку эти два мировоззрения накладывают определенный отпечаток на внешнеполитическую практику Турции и России, которые при Эрдогане и Путине регулируются персонифицированными правилами. Таким образом, изучение мировоззрения имеет большое значение для

анализа политических действий стран и прогнозирования их будущего поведения в международной политике, а также понимание причин растущего вызова Западу.

Список литературы диссертационного исследования кандидат наук Хазыр Умит Назми, 2025 год

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