Пенсионная система и фискальная политика в экономике с неоднородными агентами тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 08.00.01, кандидат наук Мамедли Мариам Октаевна

• Мамедли Мариам Октаевна
• кандидат наук
• 2018

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Мамедли Мариам Октаевна

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1. Pension systems in OECD countries and in Russia

1.1. Introduction

1.2. Overview of pension systems and recent pension reforms

1.2.1. Key types of pension systems

1.2.2. Recent pension reforms in OECD countries

1.2.3. Adequacy of the retirement income and income inequality in Russia

1.2.4. Projections of public pension expenditure in OECD and G20 countries

1.3. Pension system in Russia: challenges, projections and policy implications

1.3.1. Population forecasts

1.3.2. Recent pension reforms in Russia

1.3.3. Challenges for public finance

1.3.4. Scenario analysis of pension expenditures and policy implications

1.4. Conclusion

Chapter 2. Fiscal multiplier and the role of non-Ricardian agents

2.1. Introduction

2.2. The model

2.2.1. Households

2.2.2. Firms

2.2.3. Monetary and fiscal policy

2.2.4. Steady state

2.3. Fiscal multiplier and comparative statics

2.3.1. Deleveraging shock

2.3.2. Fiscal multiplier under a positive nominal interest rate

2.3.3. Fiscal multiplier under zero lower bound

2.3.4. Comparison of the two cases: the role of zero lower bound

2.4. Conclusion

Chapter 3. Optimal fiscal policy under an unbalanced pension system and the role of non-Ricardian agents

3.1. Introduction

3.2. The model with Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers

3.2.1. Ricardian and non-Ricardian households

3.2.2. Demography and aggregate household sector

3.2.3. Firms

3.2.4. Public sector

3.3. Model summary and social welfare

3.4. Calibration

3.5. Optimal fiscal policy instruments in a homogeneous economy

3.5.1. Policy instruments under unbalanced pension system depending on the retirement age

3.5.2. Optimal policy under balanced and unbalanced pension system

3.5.3. Robustness check: life expectancy and labor productivity

3.6. Optimal fiscal instruments: the role of non-Ricardian agents

3.6.1. Optimal income tax

3.6.2. Optimal tax instruments under an unbalanced pension system

3.6.3. Optimal public spending and the share of non-Ricardian consumers

3.6.4. Optimal fiscal instruments if discrimination is possible

3.7. Conclusion

References

Appendix

Appendix

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Пенсионная система и фискальная политика в экономике с неоднородными агентами»

Introduction

Most OECD countries have conducted pension reforms recently in order to ensure both financial sustainability of the pension systems and adequacy of pensions. This underlines the need for an analysis of the consequences of pension reforms and future public expenditure on pension provision.

Urgency of these reforms has been dictated by: first, the challenges to financial sustainability of the existing pension systems, putting additional pressure on public finances (which worsened after the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and sovereign debt crisis); and second, by the longevity coupled with sharply decreasing birth rates. Despite undertaking pension reforms, public expenditure on pensions as a percentage of GDP is expected to rise further in the near future in most OECD countries. According to OECD estimates, public spending on pensions has increased from 6.7% of GDP in 2000 to 8.2% of GDP in 2013, being the largest part of social expenditure (18% on average of the total expenditure in 2013).1 Long-term OECD forecasts for public spending on pensions suggest that this tendency would continue for most OECD countries, with the spending growing in 21 countries and falling in 14. As a result, pension expenditures are expected to increase from 8.9% of GDP in 2013-2015 to 9.5% of GDP by 2050, reaching 10.9% in 2060.2

The change of pension system characteristics such as higher retirement age or the rate of social contributions may be considered as an alternative to standard consolidation measures of public finance. Public pension systems also have a redistributive role, providing the minimum level of income at the retirement for low income households who were not able to save during their working period (minimum pensions are present in 15 OECD countries).

At the same time, an account for the existence of non-Ricardian agents (GaH et al., 2007), who consume all their disposable income and do not make any savings, is crucial in the analysis of fiscal policy (e.g. Almeida et al., 2013). It allows investigating more carefully the consequences of optimal fiscal policy and an economic impact it may have. The structure of the population should be taken into account, since fiscal policy directly affects the consumption of non-Ricardian agents and, as a result, the other macroeconomic variables.

1 Pensions at a Glance (2017), OECD Social Expenditures Database (SOCX).

2 The numbers for 2013-2015 may differ from the values presented in OECD Social Expenditures Database (SOCX) because of the different range of benefits covered and the definitions used (Pensions at a Glance, 2017).

Заключение диссертации по теме «Экономическая теория», Мамедли Мариам Октаевна

3.7. Conclusion

The OLG model with infinitely living households developed by Bettendorf and Heijdra (2006) was extended by introducing an unbalanced pension system, where the deficit of the pension fund is covered by the transfer from the government budget in the model with an endogenous interest rate. The assumption that liabilities of the pension fund are financed by the government makes the income tax and social contributions act as substitutes in the financing of pensions. During the next stage the model was extended to incorporate two types of consumers: Ricardian consumers, and non-Ricardian consumers, who consume all their disposable income.

First, the model with homogeneous agents was considered. In the case of an unbalanced pension system when both social contributions and income tax are chosen optimally, the optimal policy mix includes a positive income tax rate, which decreases with population growth, and zero social contributions. In the case of a balanced pension system social contributions should be strictly positive to cover the spending of the pension fund. Thus, concerning the combinations of policy instruments, only an internal solution is considered. However, social welfare is lower under a balanced pension system, while the level of public debt is higher, compared to the case of an unbalanced pension system. Under a balanced pension system the optimal income tax is lower than under an unbalanced pension system and does not depend on population growth. Social contributions, on the contrary, decrease with

population growth. The results also show that in equilibria with a higher retirement age, optimal social contributions (or income tax under an unbalanced pension system) are lower, as is the public debt. Therefore, pension reforms, namely increase in the retirement age, can be introduced as an additional measure of fiscal consolidation.

Second, on the basis of an extended framework, the way the optimal set of fiscal instruments change with the share of non-Ricardian consumers was shown. When income tax and social contributions are chosen optimally, the optimal rate of social contributions paid by all households becomes positive after a certain threshold level of the share of non-Ricardian consumers, coupled with the lower rate of income tax. Higher taxes lead to a lower level of per capita output. When discrimination among households is possible based on their type, after a certain proportion of non-Ricardian agents in the economy the optimal set of measures includes positive social contributions paid by non-Ricardian agents, decreasing with their income tax rate, and zero contributions paid by Ricardian agents.

An analysis of the optimal choice of social contributions, income tax and public spending shows that the optimal share of public spending increases with the share of non-Ricardian agents to increase their welfare at retirement. The optimal choice of fiscal instruments taking into account the share of non-Ricardian consumers can lead to higher social welfare.

The developed framework can be applied to the analysis of the consequences of demographic changes to public finance and to the development of the optimal consolidation measures. The framework can be extended to analyse a wider set of optimal pension reforms and fiscal policy measures and can be calibrated for a specific country.

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