Применение мер принуждения в ответ на вредоносную деятельность в компьютерных сетях: международно-правовые аспекты тема диссертации и автореферата по ВАК РФ 00.00.00, кандидат наук Мартынова Екатерина Александровна

• Мартынова Екатерина Александровна
• кандидат наук
• 2025

Оглавление диссертации кандидат наук Мартынова Екатерина Александровна

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1. MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITIES: QUALIFICATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

1.1. Malicious cyber- and ICT acts: definitions and taxonomies

1.1.1. 'ICTs' and 'cyber' terminology

1.1.2. Defining 'malicious cyber activities', a 'cyber operation' and a 'cyberattack'

1.1.3. Classification of 'traditional' (not AI-driven) cyber operations

1.1.4. AI-powered cyber operations: distinctive characteristics

1.2. Application of lex lata rules and principles of International Law to cyber operations

1.2.1. Obligation to respect State sovereignty

1.2.2. Principle of non-interference in domestic affairs

1.2.3. Prohibition of the use of force

1.2.4. International Humanitarian Law

1.2.5. Obligation of due diligence

1.3. From lex lata to lex ferenda: the cyber norms creating path

1.4. Attribution of cyber-enabled activities to a State

CHAPTER 2. RESPONDING TO STATE-SPONSORED MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITIES: LEGALITY OF COERCIVE MEASURES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

2.1. Self-defence against malicious cyber activities

2.2. Collective response by international organizations and alliances

2.2.1. Measures taken by the UN Security Council

2.2.2. Cyber defense of NATO

2.2.3. Russia and China: initiatives in cooperation on information security

2.3. Countermeasures and State responsibility in 'cyberspace'

2.3.1. Notion of 'countermeasures' and its applicability in the cyber context

2.3.2. Substantive and procedural requirements to countermeasures: lex specialis needed for cyber countermeasures?

2.3.3. Collective cyber-related countermeasures under International Law

2.4. Unilateral economic sanctions as a tool of response to malicious cyber activities

2.4.1. Economic sanctions - the main practical response to cyberattacks

2.4.2. Counter-cyber sanction regimes of the US, the EU the UK and Australia, and their implementation

CHAPTER 3. MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS OF COERCIVE MEASURES APPLIED

IN RESPONSE TO MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITIES

3.1. Measuring effectiveness of cyber-related economic sanctions by identifying their goals

3.2. Francesco Giumelli's analytical framework for measuring effectiveness of cyber-related economic sanctions

3.3. Cost-benefit analysis for the assessment of coercive measures

3.4. Mancur Olson's theory of groups

3.5. Collective reaction to cyber incidents: alliance theory

3.6. Game theory

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX. Technical translation of the dissertation into the Russian language

Введение диссертации (часть автореферата) на тему «Применение мер принуждения в ответ на вредоносную деятельность в компьютерных сетях: международно-правовые аспекты»

INTRODUCTION

Relevance of the research topic. The current level of cyber threat is estimated at about 2,200 cyberattacks in the world daily, with the annual number of cyberattacks worldwide growing by 80%o.1 Only some of malicious cyber-enabled activities taking place around the world are suspected of being State sponsored — their number based on publicly available information is estimated to be 138 for the period from 2005 to 2023 inclusive.2 At the same time, there has been a notable upsurge, over the last two decades, in the number of inter-State cyber-enabled operations taking place worldwide.3 Most of them are classified as acts of espionage,4 given that traditional methods of intelligence gathering have been supplemented by cyber capabilities, but some incidents (and their number increases with advancements in technology) have consequences in the physical space, including causing damage to individuals,5 companies,6 infrastructure facilities1 and

1 Opening remarks by Doreen Bogdan-Martin, Secretary-General of the International Telecommunications Union, to a press conference in the United Nations Office at Geneva, 1 March 2024. URL: https://www.itu.int/en/osg/Pages/Speeches.aspx?ItemID=31.

2 Council of Foreign Relations. URL: www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/.

3 According to the Council of Foreign Relations that has tracked significant cyber operations since 2005 starting with one cyber operation perpetrated by China that year, following with at least 30 State-sponsored cyber operations in 2015, 16 cyber operations sponsored by States in 2019, 125 incidents in 2022, and 114 in 2023. See: www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/.

4 One of the recent cases is phishing campaign reportedly conducted in March 2023 by the Pakistani cyberespionage group APT 36 against the Defence Research and Development Organisation - Indian governmental agency involved in research and development of sensitive defence technologies used by the Indian Armed Forces. See: 'Notorious SideCopy APT Group Sets Sights on India's DRDO'. (Cyble, 21 March 2023). URL: https://cyble.com/blog/notorious-sidecopy-apt-group-sets-sights-on-indias-drdo.

5 E.g., attacks of targeted individuals - human rights activists and university professors by APT31 (aka RedEyes, ScarCruft, and Reaper), a hacking group allegedly sponsored by North Korea. See: 'RedEyes Group Wiretapping Individuals (APT37)' (ASEC, 21 June 2023). URL: https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/54349/.

6 E.g., attacks against subsidiary companies of multinational corporations based in the US and East Asia, including industrial, technology, media, electronics, and telecommunications companies, with further access to the parent companies' network by BlackTech - cyber actors allegedly linked to the People's Republic of China. See: Press release 'CISA, NSA, FBI and Japan Release Advisory Warning of BlackTech, PRC-Linked Cyber Activity' (CISA, 21 September 2023). URL: www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-nsa-fbi-and-japan-release-advisory-warning-blacktech-prc-linked-cyber-activity.

1 E.g., targeting from late 2021 to mid-2022 of US critical infrastructure including seaports, energy companies, transit systems, and a major US utility and gas entity by Mint Sandstorm - a group allegedly associated with the Iranian government. See: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. 'Nation-State Threat Actor Mint Sandstorm Refines Tradecraft to Attack High-Value Targets' (18 April 2023). URL: www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/18/nation-state-threat-actor-mint-sandstorm-refines-tradecraft-to-attack-high-value-targets/.

computer networks.8 The relative anonymity and deniability offered by the so-called 'cyberspace' make it an attractive operational domain for States to gain strategic advantages without the fear of immediate retaliation. Amid the growing reliance on digital techniques and interconnectedness of cyber infrastructure systems States' vulnerability to cyberattacks is increasing. This vulnerability is not limited to military or government networks but extends to the sectors such as energy, finance, transportation, and healthcare. The fact that relatively few cyberattacks out of the total number of annual cyber incidents are considered being carried out by States can be explained by the intention of States to act inconspicuously, focusing on searching and obtaining the necessary information rather than carrying out highprofile actions. That is, States (at least, until recently) have been involved primarily in cyber espionage rather than open confrontation in 'cyberspace',9 and most of the cyberattacks that make the news have been conducted by hacktivists and groups not affiliated with a State or disguising any ties with the governments.10

However, the attitude of certain States towards the secrecy of their actions in 'cyberspace' has notably changed after 2022. Thus, since October 2023, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has openly acknowledged the authorship of at least five episodes of cyberattacks, the most plausible of which was the statement about an attack on the Russian company IPL Consulting which develops and implements technological solutions for managing processes in heavy industry.11 Prior to these incidents, the US officially recognized

8 E.g., an attack allegedly committed by a North Korean hacking group of the networks of Seoul National University Hospital in 2021 as a result of which hackers gained access to the personal medical records of hundreds of thousands patients. See: Shreyas Reddy, 'North Korean Hackers Stole 830K People's Data in Attack on Seoul Hospital: ROK' (NK News, 10 May 2023). URL: www.nknews.org/2023/05/north-korean-hackers-stole-830k-peoples-data-in-attack-on-seoul-hospital-rok/.

9 See, e.g.: Russell Buchan, Cyber Espionage and International Law (Hart Publishing, 2019).

10 Шакиров О., «Официальный взлом: почему в Москве и Киеве начинают открыто говорить о кибервойне» [Official hack: why Moscow and Kyiv are starting to talk openly about cyberwar] (Forbes, 20 December 2023). URL: https://www.forbes.ru/mneniya/502767-oficial-nyj-vzlom-pocemu-v-moskve-i-kieve-nacinaut-otkryto-govorit-o-kibervojne. (in Russian).

11 Martin Fornusek, 'Military Intelligence Claims Cyberattack on IT Company Providing Services to Russian Defense Industry' (The Kyiv Independent, 27 January 2024). URL: https://kyivindependent.com/military-intelligence-claims-powerful-cyberattack-on-russian-it-company.

operation 'Glowing Symphony' against ISIS12 in 2016,13 and Australia announced offensive operations in 2020 against cybercriminals overseas.14 However, the statements of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate, especially of 12 December 2023 on hacking of the Federal Tax Service of Russia15 and of 17 August 2024 on attacking an Internet provider in Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk region) resulting in the disconnection from the Internet of a number of strategic enterprises in the city, including VNIITF (a research institute within Rosatom's system that develops nuclear warheads),16 are unprecedented — there have never been cases before when a State proactively acknowledged a destructive cyberattack on nuclear and civilian cyber infrastructure. In a similar mode, on 9 October 2024 an adviser to the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (part of the Iranian Armed Forces) publicly stated that Iran carried out a cyberattack on Israeli air defense systems during a missile strike on Israel, allowing Tehran to hit its designated targets.17 Probably, official statements on behalf of a Ukrainian governmental agency and Iranian Armed Forces are designed for mostly informational effect. Still, they show that many former taboos on consideration of the military use of 'cyberspace' have been lifted and bring the debate about State responsibility for such malicious acts to the forefront like never before.

The introduction of artificial intelligence (the 'AI') technology18 and the

12 Terrorist organization banned in Russia.

13 Dina Temple-Raston, 'How The U.S. Hacked ISIS' (npr, 26 September 2019). URL: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis.

14 Defence Ministers, press release 'On the offensive against COVID-19 cyber criminals' (7 April 2020). URL: https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2020-04-07/offensive-against-covid-19-cyber-criminals.

15 @ DIUkraine, 12 December 2023. URL: https://t.me/DIUkraine/3194 (last visited 4 May 2024).

16 @ DIUkraine, 17 August 2024. URL: https://t.me/DIUkraine/4266 (last visited 19 August 2024).

17 «Иран сообщил о кибератаке на ПВО Израиля во время ракетного удара» [Iran reports cyberattack on Israel's air defenses during missile strike] (in Russian) (ТАСС, 9 October 2024). URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/22079227.

18 Despite the ubiquitous nature of AI discussions lately, there is no consistent 'official' legal definition of AI. In some cases, the technical descriptions offered by computer scientists are not suitable for legal analysis, for example when AI is defined in terms of an 'algorithm', which in turn requires a separate definition and understanding of the social meaning and legal content. For the review of different approaches to define AI for the purposes of legal studies, refer, e.g. to Jaemin Lee, Artificial Intelligence and International Law (Springer, 2022). P. 6-8.

This paper does not aim to go deeper into the search for a correct definition of AI; the now traditional approach to define Ai in the narrow and broad senses suits the purposes of this study: 'More specifically, that there is a key difference between narrow AI such as translation services, chatbots, and autonomous vehicles and general AI—"self-

increased autonomy (and therefore, unpredictability and unreliability19) of interState cyber operations further enhances States' vulnerability to malicious activities in 'cyberspace'. One can assume with a certain degree of confidence that the use of AI by States will expand. This is evidenced by numerous forecasts by cybersecurity experts,20 and direct declarations of States,21 coupled with an unprecedented increase in investments in research and development of AI-powered capabilities.22 This rapid development of technology, alongside the spiraling increase in the tension of the geopolitical situation, is pushing States not only to develop national strategies on reacting to cyber threats for their 'internal use', but also to articulate their positions in the international arena on individual and collective means of response to the malicious actions of other States in 'cyberspace'. Relevant developments in International Law, as well as inter-State practice, have rooted motivation of this study, its goals, and methodological approaches.

Level of development of the topic. The emergence and then the rapid development of scientific discussion on the application of International Law to

learning systems that can learn from experience with humanlike breadth and surpass human performance on all tasks". General AI raises broader existential concerns, such as how to align the goals of such a system with our own to prevent catastrophic outcomes, but general AI remains a technology still to be developed in the distant future.' (Joshua P. Meltzer, 'The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on International Trade' (Brookings, 13 December 2018). URL: www.brookings.edu/research/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-on-international-trade/#footnote-1.

19 Marta Stroppa, 'Legal and Ethical Implications of Autonomous Cyber Capabilities: a Call for Retaining Human Control in Cyberspace' (2023) 25 Ethics and Information Technology. P. 7.

20 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 'The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Autonomous Weapon Systems and Cyber Operations'. Report No. 7 (2017). URL: https://unidir.org/files/publication/pdfs/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-cyber-operations-en-690.pdf; Центр стратегических разработок, «Прогноз развития рынка кибербезопасности в Российской Федерации на 20242028 годы» [Russian cybersecurity market development forecast for 2024-2028] (8 October 2024). URL: https://www.csr.ru/upload/iblock/f14/bnl532lqmqd0u23s1ftuzw4n3ycm1to1.pdf. (in Russian).

21 Thus, the Cyber Security Strategy for Germany of 2021 indicates the aim to achieve 'the highest possible level of IT security for AI systems' and examine continually 'the opportunities for using AI systems to protect (government) IT systems'. See: Cyber Security Strategy for Germany 2021. URL: www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/it-internet-policy/cyber-security-strategy/cyber-security-strategy-node.html, at 46-47. In a similar mode, the US National Cybersecurity Strategy of 2023 sets forth as a strategic objective focus on technologies 'that will prove decisive for U.S. leadership in the coming decade' including AI, and states that such effort 'will facilitate the proactive identification of potential vulnerabilities, as well as the research to mitigate them'. See: The White House, 'Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces National Cybersecurity Strategy' (2 March 2023). URL: www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/02/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-national-cybersecurity-strategy/, at 25.

22 The projected growth of the AI market is up to 1.8 trillion US dollars by 2030: 'Artificial Intelligence (AI) Market Size Worldwide in 2021 with a Forecast until 2030 (in million U.S. dollars)' (Statista). URL: www.statista.com/statistics/1365145/artificial-intelligence-market-size/.

'cyberspace' and the responsibility of States for malicious cyber activities is associated with the first massive cyber incidents against governmental agencies. In 2007, Estonian government networks were harassed with a distributed denial of service (the 'DDoS') attack by unknown foreign intruders.23 Some government online services were temporarily disrupted, and online banking was halted. Amid complications in relations between Estonia and Russia due to the Estonian government's decision to relocate the 'Bronze Soldier Memorial' in Tallinn, a 'Russian trace' was seen in this incident.24 An Estonian student of Russian origin was arrested, charged and convicted with one minor element of the attack (targeting a political party's website). Some individuals within the Russian political establishment were claimed to have been involved, as well as individuals in contested locations such as Transnistria. The attack enhanced the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (the 'NATO') cooperation with a think tank 'NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence' (the 'CCDCOE') been established and based in Tallinn. Through the efforts of an international group of legal experts, the Tallinn Manual, a guidebook for governments on the application of International Law in situations of cyber incidents, was produced.25 It is worth noting that the task of the expert group was to commission a major study on cyber warfare, and the main focus of the Tallinn Manual was the International Law governing the use of cyber force by States and the employment of cyber operations during an armed conflict.

Заключение диссертации по теме «Другие cпециальности», Мартынова Екатерина Александровна

ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ

Целью настоящего диссертационного исследования является рассмотрение индивидуальных и коллективных мер принуждения, применяемых государствами в ответ на злонамеренные действия в компьютерных сетях, присвоенные государству, а также разработка комплексного подхода для оценки правомерности таких мер с точки зрения международного права и их эффективности для предотвращения кибератак и воздействия на атакующие государства. На основании результатов исследования автор приходит к следующим основным выводам.

Анализ официальных позиций государств по вопросам ответственности за злонамеренное использование ИКТ выявил консенсус относительно применимости норм и принципов международного права, и, в частности, Устава ООН, в «киберпространстве». В то же время все еще остаются вопросы о том, кто может обеспечивать соблюдение норм и принципов международного права в отношении кибернетических действий, как они должны применяться и в каких конкретных обстоятельствах. Межгосударственные кибероперации могут потенциально нарушать несколько основных норм международного права, включая принципы суверенитета, невмешательства во внутренние дела, запрета на применение силы, а в контексте вооруженных конфликтов — нормы международного гуманитарного права. Однако конкретное применение этих норм в «киберпространстве» является сложным и спорным.

Осторожный подход государств к официальному присвоению поведения негосударственных акторов в «киберпространстве» государству привел к формированию стратегии «навешивания ярлыков» как основному средству выявления нежелательного поведения. Практические случаи публичного порицания предполагаемых организаторов вредоносных кибератак не сопровождаются квалификацией нарушения конкретной нормы международного права. Более того, обвинения не подкрепляются раскрытием

доказательств, соответствующих хотя бы одному из стандартов, которые могут быть применимы в соответствии с международным правом. По ряду технических и юридических причин присвоение остается крайне политизированным процессом и используется скорее как инструмент стигматизации, чем как инструмент для привлечения конкретного государства к ответственности.

Анализ позиций государств выявил почти полное согласие относительно общей применимости права ответственности государств, включая контрмеры, в «киберпространстве», и при этом отсутствие ясности относительно процессуальных предпосылок, применимых к контрмерам в ответ на кибероперации. Обращение к истории разработки Статей об ответственности пролило свет на переход от традиционной двусторонней модели принуждения к коллективным или солидарным мерам и, наконец, к «спасительной оговорке» о коллективных мерах реагирования как необходимому компромиссу среди составителей. Дальнейшее развитие межгосударственных отношений показывает, что государства в целом охотно сотрудничают для усиления репутационного, политического и экономического давления за злонамеренные действия в «киберпространстве». Это сотрудничество до сих пор принимало формы коллективных обвинений и коллективных экономических санкций. В то же время некоторые государства (в первую очередь США) демонстрируют стремление расширить инструментарий мер, применяемых коллективно для реагирования на злонамеренные киберинциденты, независимо от их правовой квалификации. Это позволяет сделать вывод о том, что государства готовы присоединиться к применению таких мер, руководствуясь соображениями рационального выбора и (или) условиями нахождения в альянсе или коалиции «единомышленников». Использование коллективных контрмер, таким образом, может в определенный момент стать логичным шагом к наращиванию совместных усилий государств, в том числе в рамках альянсов, по противодействию киберинцидентам.

Экономические санкции, применяемые индивидуально и коллективно, остаются центральной мерой реагирования на вредоносную деятельность с применением ИКТ на практике. Государства подталкиваются к применению санкций как к форме самопомощи ребусом проблем, связанных с правовой основой для квалификации первоначальной вредоносной кибероперации как нарушения международного права и, следовательно, возможным обращением к праву международной ответственности в ответ на нее. Напротив, национальное или наднациональное право о санкциях, как в случаях США, ЕС, Великобритании и Австралии, предоставляет возможность расширить сферу деятельности с применением ИКТ практически для всех типов кибердеяний, не оглядываясь на вопросы применимости, нормативности и пороговых значений некиберспецифических норм международного права в «киберпространстве». Использование санкций помогает избежать обязанности раскрывать доказательства и связывать виновных с конкретным государством и обеспечивает свободу от давления стандартов доказывания, применяемых в международном праве.

Однако удобство применения экономических санкций для борьбы с вредоносными кибероперациями, предположительно совершенными при поддержке другого государства, не безгранично. Масштаб мер, которые могут быть использованы в качестве ответа, ограничен, поскольку, как только санкции сами по себе нарушают международно-правовые обязательства государств-инициаторов, они могут быть правомерными только в том случае, если они либо соответствуют всем критериям, установленным для контрмер, либо подпадают под одно из исключений, предусмотренных правом международной ответственности. Злоупотребление санкциями, которое может вытекать из каждого из его элементов, включая масштаб вредоносных действий, обозначение целей санкций и определение объема и продолжительности ограничений, может включать спираль санкций и контрсанкций, при условии, что они могут быть развернуты с сопоставимой скоростью и объемом государством-объектом. Таким образом, у инициаторов

есть стимул не подходить слишком близко к «красным линиям», установленным международным правом, или не эксплуатировать его имманентную неопределенность.

Использование аналитических инструментов, выходящих за рамки позитивизма, при оценке эффективности санкций, связанных с «киберпространством», показало, что, хотя их применение не привело к каким-либо видимым изменениям в количестве и интенсивности вредоносных кибератак, тем самым доказав их весьма ограниченную способность принуждать объект к изменению своего поведения или ограничивать его путем снижения его потенциала для проведения новых операций, эти ограничительные меры эффективны в достижении цели информирования предполагаемого организатора кибероперации и третьих лиц о дальнейшем курсе действий инициатора и стигматизации нарушителя.

В целом, раскол в заявленных позициях государств по поводу действия вторичных норм международного права в «киберпространстве» и растущая конфронтация в кибердискурсе между западными государствами, с одной стороны, и Россией и Китаем, с другой, предопределяют ограниченные перспективы разработки универсального международного договора об ответственном поведении государств в «киберпространстве» в ближайшем будущем. Это обсуждение в ближайшие годы, по всей вероятности, будет проходить преимущественно среди «государств-единомышленников», в рамках региональных союзов, на двусторонней основе, а также на негосударственных форумах. Усложнение межгосударственных киберопераций технологией ИИ поднимает дополнительные вопросы о применении международного права к киберинцидентам с использованием ИИ. Развертывание СЛАВ и усложнение ИИпКО потенциально могут привести к новой — на этот раз основанной на ИИ — гонке вооружений, поскольку государства стремятся разрабатывать и приобретать эти системы для поддержания стратегического паритета. Это может дестабилизировать глобальную безопасность и повысить риск эскалации конфликта. Это и другие

политические и этические соображения говорят в пользу ограничения дискреционных полномочий государств в использовании ИИ. Однако на сегодняшний день стимулы для государств НАТО, Китая и России договориться о международном обязывающем документе, ограничивающем использование ИИ в злонамеренных целях, кажутся иллюзорными. Исходя из истории дискуссий о применении международного права в «киберпространстве» и разработки правил ответственного поведения государств, использующих ИКТ, можно предположить, что соответствующие дискуссии по ИИ, вероятно, будут развиваться за пределами области разработки международного договора.

Дальнейший анализ развития норм ответственного поведения государства в «киберпространстве» и ответственного использования ИИ, таким образом, потребует изучения того, как транснациональные нормы, такие как те, которые возникают из инструментов «мягкого права», обычаев и инициатив частного сектора, будут формировать международный правовой ландшафт. Понимание того, как международные правовые нормы адаптируются и совершенствуются в ответ на возникающие вызовы, требует динамических аналитических подходов для рассмотрения правового диалога и взаимодействия между различными правовыми системами, включая внутренние правовые системы, региональные структуры и глобальные нормы в непрерывном процессе толкования, аргументации и практики.

Список литературы диссертационного исследования кандидат наук Мартынова Екатерина Александровна, 2025 год

БИБЛИОГРАФИЯ

Международные договоры

1. Соглашение между правительствами государств-членов Шанхайской организации сотрудничества о сотрудничестве в области обеспечения международной информационной безопасности, подписано 16 июня 2009 года, вступило в силу 5 января 2012 года.

2. Соглашение между Правительством Российской Федерации и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о сотрудничестве в области обеспечения международной информационной безопасности, подписано 8 мая 2015 года, вступило в силу 10 августа 2016 года.

3. African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, adopted on 27 June 2014, entered into force on 8 June 2023.

4. United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes. Adopted by the UNGA on 24 December 2024. A/RES/79/243.

Решения и сообщения международных и наднациональных организаций,

ассоциаций и конференций

5. UN Security Council Res. S/RES/2341 (13 February 2017).

6. UN Security Council, press release ''Explosive' Growth of Digital Technologies Creating New Potential for Conflict, Disarmament Chief Tells Security Council in First-Ever Debate on Cyberthreats' (29 June 2021). URL: https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14563.doc.htm.

7. UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX) 'Definition of Aggression' (14 December 1974).

8. UNGA Res. A/RES/53/70 'Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security' (4 December 1998).

9. UNGA Res. 56/83, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (12 December 2001).

10. UNGA Res. A/RES/64/211 'Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and Taking Stock of National Efforts to Protect Critical Information Infrastructures' (21 December 2009).

11. UNGA 'Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security' UN Doc A/68/98 (24 June 2013).

12. UNGA Res. A/RES/73/27 'Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security' (11 December 2018).

13. UNGA Res. A/RES/75/240 'Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security' (4 January 2021).

14. UNGA 'Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security'. Final Substantive Report A/AC.290/2021/CRP.2 (10 March 2021).

15. UNGA 'Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security' UN Doc A/76/135 (14 July 2021).

16. UNGA Res. A/RES/77/37 'Programme of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security' (7 December 2022).

17. UNGA Res. A/RES/77/37 'Programme of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security' (12 December 2022).

18. UNGA Res. A/RES/78/132 'Information and Communications Technologies for Sustainable Development' (19 December 2023).

19. International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001). UN Doc. A/56/10.

20. International Law Commission, Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001). UN Doc. A/56/10.

21. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security, UN Doc A/76/135 (14 July 2021).

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23. ICRC, 'Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law'. URL: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.

24. ICRC, 'Protecting Civilians Against Digital Threats During Armed Conflict'. URL: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/protecting-civilians-against-digital-threats-during-armed-conflict.

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26. Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021. URL: https : //www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.

27. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Cyber Attacks Threatening the Union or its Member States.

28. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1125 of 30 July 2020, Implementing Regulation 2019/796 Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union or Its Member States as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1748 of 20 November 2020 Amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union Or its Member States.

29. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1536 of 22 October 2020, Of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/796 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Cyber Attacks Threatening the Union or Its Member States.

30. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1779 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Cyberattacks Threatening the Union or its Member States.

31. Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Doc 5664/18 (4 May 2018). URL: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5664-2018-INIT/en/pdf.

32. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade (16 December 2020). URL: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/eus-cybersecurity-strategy-digital-decade-0.

33. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. URL: www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.

34. OECD, 'Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence' (Paris: OECD, 2019). URL: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0449.

35. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. URL: https : //www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120 214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

36. The Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, SI 2020/597 and The Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No 4) Regulations 2020, SI 2020/597.

37. XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration. 23 June 2022. URL: www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/xiv-brics-summit-beijing-declaration.

Национальные нормативные акты

38. Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в области международной информационной безопасности, утверждены Указом Президента Российской Федерации N 213 от 12 апреля 2021 года.

39. Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, утверждена Указом Президента Российской Федерации N 400 от 2 июля 2021 года.

40. Федеральный закон «О безопасности критической информационной инфраструктуры Российской Федерации» N 187-ФЗ от 26 июля 2017 года.

41. Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other Thematic Sanctions) Act 2021, C2021A00128. URL: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2021A00128.

42. Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other Thematic Sanctions) Regulations 2021, F2021L01855. URL: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2021L01855.

43. Executive Order of the US President No 13687, 80 FR 817 (2 January 2015).

44. Executive Order of the US President No 13694, 80 FR 18077 (1 April 2015).

45. Executive Order of the US President No 13722, 81 FR 14941 (15 March 2016).

46. Executive Order of the US President No 13757, 82 FR 1 (28 December 2016).

47. Executive Order of the US President No 14024, 86 FR 20249 (15 April 2021).

Официальные позиции государств

48. Ответ спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по вопросам международного сотрудничества в области информационной безопасности А. В. Крутских на вопрос информагентства TACC о состоянии международного диалога в этой сфере (29 июня 2017 года). URL: www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/ asset_publisher/ cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/2804288.

49. Australia's International Cyber Engagement Strategy 2017. URL: www.internationalcybertech.gov.au/about/2017-International-Cyber-Engagement- Strategy.

50. China's Contribution to the Initial Pre-Draft of OEWG Report. URL: https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/china-contribution-to-oewg-pre-draft-report-final.pdf.

51. Cyber Security Strategy for Germany 2021. URL: www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/it-internet-policy/cyber-security-strategy/cyber-security-strategy-node.html.

52. Declaration by Cuba, at the Final Session of Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (23 June 2017). URL: http://misiones.minrex.gob.cu/en/un/statements/71 -unga-cuba-final-session-group-governmental-experts-developments-field-information.

53. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Cyber Engagement Strategy, Annex A: Supplement to Australia's Position on the Application of International Law to State Conduct in Cyberspace, 2019; Australia's Cyber Engagement Strategy, Annex A: Australia's Position on How International Law Applies to State Conduct in Cyberspace, 2017.

54. Finland's National Positions, International Law and Cyberspace (2020). URL: https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/finland-views-cyber-and-international-law-oct-2020.pdf.

55. Germany, 'On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace: Position Paper' (March 2021). URL: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2446304/32e7b2498e 10b74fb 17204c54665bdf0/on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace-data.pdf.

56. Government of Canada, International Law Applicable in Cyberspace (April 2022). URL: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/cyberspace_law-cyberespace_droit.aspx?lang=eng.

57. Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Position Paper on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace (6 July 2023). URL: https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/ourrolepolicies/internationallaw/Ireland— National-Position-Paper.pdf.

58. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Kingdom's Position on Iranian policy (27 March 2016). URL: https://www.mofa.gov.sa/KingdomForeignPolicy/KingdomPosition/Pages/ 17637623.aspx.

59. Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary General (23 September 1998), UN Doc. A/C1/53/3.

60. Ministère des Armées, France, 'International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace' (October 2019). URL: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file /international+law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf. (in French).

61. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 'The Republic of Poland's Position on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace' (29 December 2022). URL: https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/the-republic-of-polands-position-on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace.

62. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, 'Costa Rica's Position on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace' (21 July 2023). URL: https://docs-library.unoda. org/Open-

Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technolog ies_-_(2021 )/Costa_Rica_-_Position_Paper_-_International_Law_in_Cyberspace. pdf.

63. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, Letter to the Parliament on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace (26 September 2019). URL: https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace.

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65. Position Paper of the Republic of Austria: Cyber Activities and International Law. URL: https://docs-library.unoda.org/Open-Ended_Working_Group_on_Information_and_Communication_Technolog ies_-_(2021 )/Austrian_Position_Paper_-

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66. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (20 February 2020). URL : https://mfa.gov. ge/News/Statement-of-the-Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs-o-(7).aspx?CatID=5.

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Судебная и арбитражная практика

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71. ICJ. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1966] ICJ Rep 226.

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77. PCIJ. SSLotus case (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Rep (Ser A, No 10).

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